Europe Cannot Build Satellites Without American Chips and Has No Fallback

European spacecraft rely on radiation-hardened electronic components — processors, FPGAs, power devices, memories — that are overwhelmingly manufactured in the United States and subject to ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) export controls. A single U.S. policy change, export denial, or supply disruption could halt European satellite production. The European Commission, ESA, and the European Defence Agency have jointly identified 41 critical space technology dependencies where no European source exists. The European Component Initiative (ECI) aims for 50% European EEE-component procurement on a typical spacecraft, but as of 2024, Europe lacks domestic production capability for radiation-hardened processors, high-reliability FPGAs, and several categories of power devices — components at the functional core of every spacecraft.

Europe is the world's second-largest civil space power, operating Earth observation constellations (Copernicus/Sentinel), navigation systems (Galileo), and science missions (JUICE, Euclid) that serve 450 million citizens. The global space economy exceeds $400 billion annually, with European industry holding significant market share in commercial satellite manufacturing and launch services. But this capability is built on a foundation of non-European components that are procured under export licenses that can be revoked. During periods of geopolitical tension, ITAR restrictions have already caused delivery delays and design constraints for European missions. Europe's total civil space technology R&D budget (~€1.345 billion in 2024) is less than one-fifth of U.S. spending, making it structurally difficult to duplicate capabilities across the full component spectrum.

ESA's ECI has funded development of European-source alternatives for specific component families, but progress is slow: developing a flight-qualified radiation-hardened component from design through fabrication, characterization, and qualification typically takes 7–10 years. The EU has funded the first radiation-hardened FPGA on an entirely European supply chain, but it remains in development. GaN (gallium nitride) power device development has achieved results at <100V and 650V ranges, with 200V development starting in 2025 — but industrialization for widespread adoption requires additional years. A new European heavy-ion irradiation facility (>1 GeV/n) is being built for testing complex components, but complex electronics like Systems-in-Package and Systems-on-Chip require this facility because existing European test infrastructure cannot replicate the radiation environment without physically modifying the component under test. The ESA Harmonisation process systematically addresses 10 of 50+ technology areas per year, meaning some critical gaps may wait years for their harmonisation cycle.

Accelerated progress requires: (1) compressed qualification timelines — the 7–10 year component qualification cycle means decisions made today won't yield flight-qualified parts until the 2030s; methods to accelerate radiation testing and qualification while maintaining reliability standards would have systemic impact; (2) European foundry partnerships that can produce rad-hard components at sufficient quality and volume — ST Microelectronics is the primary European candidate but faces capacity and technology constraints; (3) FPGA-based approaches where a single radiation-hardened FPGA platform can replace multiple application-specific components, reducing the number of items requiring dedicated European development; (4) design-for-non-dependence approaches where spacecraft architectures are designed from the start to use European-source components, rather than attempting to substitute after design completion; (5) pooled demand aggregation across ESA, EU, and national programs to create sufficient production volume to justify European manufacturing investment.

An EE/policy team could map the complete component supply chain for a specific European satellite mission (Copernicus Sentinel data is publicly available), identifying which components are single-source, which are ITAR-controlled, and where European alternatives exist or are in development. This supply chain vulnerability assessment would reveal the actual depth of dependence. An engineering team could evaluate whether specific ITAR-controlled component functions could be implemented on the European rad-hard FPGA under development, designing reference implementations and benchmarking performance against the U.S.-source application-specific parts they would replace. Skills in digital design, FPGA development, and space systems engineering would be most relevant.